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Procedural fairness and unjustified dismissal. 
Gordon Anderson* 
The decision of· the ~Court of Appeal in The Auckland City Council v Hennessey ( 1982} 1 
has en1phasised that a disn1issal that is otherrvise justified tnaJ' be held to be unjustified if 
the procedures leading up to the dis1nissal were unfair or unjust. This paper exanzines the 
decision in Hennessey and discusses t1.vo aspects of procedural unfainzess; the failure to 
follo\v an agreed procedure and the failure to all OM' the worker an opportunifJ' to offer an 
explanation. This discussion places particular en1phasis on developnzents since Hennessey. 
Since the Arbitration Court was given jurisdiction to settle grievances over unjustified 
disrnissal by section 1 17 of the Jndustn·az Relations Act 19 73, it has been prepared to take 
son1e account of procedural fairness in deten11ining whether or not a dismissal was unjusti-
fied. Hughes (1981 ), in a review of the Court's decisions, points out that possible grounds 
for a finding of unjustified disn1issal have included the unwarranted reference to a worker's 
past conduct, the failure by an employer to warn a worker that their conduct or perfor-
tnance is unsatisfactory and the failure to allow a worker the chance to offer an explanation 
for alleged misconduct. 
The correctness of the Court's approach to procedural fairness has now been upheld by 
the Court of Appeal decision in The Auckland City Council v Hennessey (1982) where the 
Court rejected the e1nployer's argument that t11'e word "unjustifiable" relates to the fact 
of the dis1nissal and does not extend to any procedure adopted by the e1nployer in reach-
ing the decision to dis1niss. 
This paper examines the decision in HennesseJ' and then looks at two particular aspects 
of procedural fairness; the failure to follow an agreed procedure and the failure to allow an 
opportunity to offer an explanation. Both aspects relate to fairness at the tilne of distnissa·l 
and not fairness in the longer tenn such as the need to give warning of unsatisfactory work. 
It will be suggested that the Court's approach to procedural fairness has not always been 
consistent or satisfactory but that, since the HennesseJ' decision, a more consistent and 
coherent approach has begun to en}erge. 
Why procedural fairness? 
Section 117 envisages that a claim of unjustified disn1issaJ will be dealt with by tl1e 
\Vorker's union taking the grievance to a grievance con1n1ittee, and, if no settle1nent is 
reached, to the Arbitration Court. These two forun1s provide a reasonable guarantee that 
any grievance will be fairly and in1partially dealt with. While this is 1nore or less self-evident 
in the Court, it is also ensured at the grievance con11nittee by requiring that both parties 
agree or that (as is often the practice) an independent chainnan is given the power to make 
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a worker. It is in the interests of justice that these be 
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able hardship can be incurred. This was illustrated by Holtz (1911} 
cases where the Court has explicitly dealt with the 
(1981, p. 169) points out that a dismissal for misconduct may-
rnent benefits and, of course, a dismissal for misconduct caa 
obtaining new employment. The recognition of such factors in 
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The point that procedural fairness at the time of dismissal Ia ~ 
practice is reinforced by provisions dealing with it in such 
tion and Recommendation Concerning Termination of Employment 
the British industrial relations Code of Practice. 
The Hennessey decision 
The Court of Appeal's decision in Hennessey approves the approach that die 
Court has adopted since the first cases it decided under section 117; ie. 1 
n1ay be unjustifiable because of the lack of procedural fairness. The 
out of a decision by the Arbitration Court that a dismissal was unjustified (at 
because of the failure of the employer to allow the worker the chance to clefea4• 
his actions before a decision was made to dismiss him. The employer appealed to 
of Appeal by way of case stated under section 62A of the Industrltll Reltltkml Atit 
The case stated for the opinion of the Court of Appeal contained several queatkma 
two relevant to procedural fairness were: 
a) Does an employee have the right to be heard before an employer 
nate his employment? 
b) Were we correct in our view that a failure to give an employee an 
heard before he is dismissed amounts to a ground upon which a of 
dismissal can be based within section 117 of the Industrial Relatlolil Act.l 
The Court of Appeal, in answering these questions, was reluctant to lay dowa 
or to give answers to absolute tern1s which "could be mistakenly appUed to 
different facts". The Court's decision on the interpretation of "unjustlftablf 
section 117 was however, sufficiently broad to encompass procedural falhutl. 
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These two cases indicate that the failure to fcdlow 
factor influencing the Court's decision. One cue, 
cate that this may not always be so and instead the Co1lrt 
avoid the procedural point. 
Meredith concerned a worker (airline steward) who,.._ 
ing a rifle (without its firing mechanism) onto an aircraft ......,. 
tripod. It was accepted that this action was completely 
incident (during which time the worker continued normal 
' . ".j " 1 ' 
.. • .. '!' ' ~ ' called to a meeting, on one hour's notice, and dismissed. The decJaloa 
that the dismissal was decided on at, or after, the meeting and that the reaaea for 
was the worker's attitude to the gravity of the incident rather than the actual 
itself. . , _,..__ 
The decision also indicates that, although the worker was g~ven one hour s notice v1 ..., 
meeting, he was not made aware of the reason for it or its possible significance. AD atteatpt 
by the employer to contact the union (in the one hour period?) was unsuccessful~ 
The award contained several clauses relevant to dismissal and disciplinary action. 11ae 
relevant ones were clause 22 (b) which required an adverse report affecting a workt.r to be 
communicated to the worker and clause 22 (c) which provided "that at any enquiry held 
by the company concerning any cabin crew member . . . the member may invite a union 
representative to be present". Claus~ 21 (c), in a proviso, allowed summary dismissal for 
"intoxication while on duty or in unifonn or misconduct". 
The majority of the Court held that, because the dismissal was a summary dismissal for 
n1isconduct, clause 22 (b) did not apply. The employer was not therefore bound to disclose 
reports that had been prepared on the incident. The majority also made little mention of 
the absence of union representation except to say that the lack of it did "not ... vitiate 
the procedures adopted by the company". The attitude seemed to be (although this is 
unclear) that it was up to the worker to invite a representative. 
The majority decision in Meredith is unfortunate and inadequate for several reasons. 
The first is that, as Mr Jacobs in a dissenting opinion pointed out, the right to invite union 
representation requires that the worker be able to make a considered decision, which 
requires knowledge that the enquiry concerns himself, his right to invite representation, 
and an opportunity to arrange for representation. It seems that the worker was unaware of 
the nature of the meeting to which he was called and probably he would have had no more 
luck in contacting the union than the employer. It is significant that the employer consi-
dered the meeting sufficiently serious to attempt to contact the union. 
The second disturbing feature is the majority decision that a summary dismissal over-
rides procedural safeguards. This was applied to the need to communicate adverse reports, 
but probably could have been equally applied to the union representation right. This 
argument may have validity in the context of a dismissal that immediately follows the 
rnisconduct, but it is difficult to see why it should be applied to a dismissal decided on at 
an enquiry held a month after the incident. The characterisation of such a dismissal as 
summary would, in addition, stretch the concept of summary dismissal well beyond its 
normal meaning. When this reasoning is used to deny a worker the benefit of award safe-
guards it would seem to be completely mistaken. 
The fact that the dismissal was not because of the worker's conduct, but his attitude to 
it, makes the decision even less understandable. Mr Jacobs suggests that "talking at cross-
pur~oses" may well have explained the dismissal as the worker was defending his conduct 
(whtch se~ms .to have been. not only innocent but reasonable in the circumstances) rather 
th~n constde.nng the secunty aspects and hypothetical consequences of the conduct. If 
t!11s was so, 1t ~ould seem that access to the reports on the incident and union representa-
tion at the enqutry may well have avoided the dismissal. 
~t ~s to be hoped that Meredith was an exception arising from what seems to be the 
InaJonty's concern with the security implications of the case. It was however a case where 
the Court could and, probably should, have taken a much finner attitude to procedural 
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We think that nor1nally no advance notice of a 
cases if an employee is told the nature of and detala I 
he m~y fairly be asked for an explanation at that poillt. 
The Court did however go on to concede that, in some cases. 
The Epps case was such a situation because a less serious contp~atat~. 
been warned about, had turned into one of a much more serious aatae 
gation. The Court felt that in, those circumstances, some advaace 
situation was required. 
It is not clear from other cases when notice of a complaiRt W0111d be 
matters as the seriousness of the allegation, the time since its occurrence ..S 
knowledge of the possibility of a complaint may well be facton the Coart 
relevant. 
It is possible, although not yet decided, that a hearing or opportunity of 
an environment that confuses or intimidates a worker could also be unfair. 11ae type of 
situation in Holtz, where the worker was called before three managerlalataff, a 
director and a senior executive, is possibly one where the environmeat coald fill 
oppressive to the worker. The situation in Holley ( 1979) is also an illustratioa ef 
problems that may arise. In that case, the worker was dismissed for attempted tlaeftoa 
basis of a police statement that there was sufficient evidence to support a 11 lhl It• 
The employer was criticised by the Court for relying on the police opinion and not lllldal 
their own inquiries. It would seem pointless however for the employer to have • 
explanation from a worker who, before, during and after the dismissal, wu in 
"custody". 
The Court has also indicated that the opportunity to provide an explanation need not 
be formally made as long as some opportunity is in fact given. In Manh. the completion 
of an accident claim fonn for insurance purposes was held to be sufficient. In other sltua· 
tions, a higher standard has been indicated as desirable, particularly where the ckarp is a 
serious one. In Keir (1981) the Court said: 
The ground for Mr Keir's dismissal is a most serious one and the nature of the 
misconduct alleged is such that there are grave consequences for his reputation 
and future. Hence the misconduct must be established by evidence which Ia 
sufficient to justify a decision so serious. 
While it is difficult to identify trends from Court decisions there does seem to be 
movement towards a finner attitude to the failure to afford the opportunity of aa explaaa-
tion. The Court of Appeal decision in Hennessey in particular would seem to have liven 
the Arbitration Court greater confidence. 
In a case decided shortly after the Hennessey decision became available (Gould, 1982) 
the Court laid particular emphasis on Hennessey, which it described as a "new and impor-
tant development" and went on to hold a dismissal was unjustified because: 
the employer should have provided an opportunity for Mrs Gould to state her 
case fully and there should have been an attempt by the employer to resolve the 
differences between the two women . . . Justice and fairness demanded such an 
opportunity. This the employer did not provide. For that reason we hold Mrs 
Gould's dismissal to be unjustified. 
Recently, in Organ (1982), a dismissal has been held to be "proceduraHy unjuatlfteci" 
because no explanation of reported misconduct was asked for. The sparse facts 
~ndi_cate that, a~art from the failure to allow an explanation, the dismissal may have 
JUStified. In earher days, before the emphasis on procedural fairness, it may weB have been 
held to be justified. 
The most significant case on procedural fairness since Hennestey was decided Ia Epps_ 
This case received some publicity because it involved sexual harrassment2 • In outllae, the 
facts were that Epps put his hand on the bottom of a female worker who made It clear that 
she resented this conduct and complained to both her union and the employer. 
2 For the sequel to this case see Broadsheet No. lOS, December 1981. 
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What would seem clear is that tile 
failing a satisfactory explanation, to the 
a dismissal based on the refusal to provide a 
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Holley also is illustrative of difficulties that could arile. 
prior to dismissal, been under some pressure by the po1iee 1114. 
taken to the employer en route to the police station. Any at1eiiiJlJit 
in such circumstances would seem both pointless and unwise. The 
probably be applied to any inquiry by an employer, particularly if 
is involved. Both cases provide good arguments for suspension uatil 61 
disposed of. In both Greer and Holley the workers were in fact acquitted. 
It should be noted that the above points apply only where th.o coad1lct er 
ambiguous. If an employer has good reason to suspect theft, it mar 1Je p8llib1e 
the dismissal on those grounds alone, remembering the ia 
allegations. The Court in Loau (1981) seems to have accepted this poiat, 
indicated in that case that the employers belief mUit be sustainable and 6at a 
dishonesty does not preclude the need to seek an explanation from the worker. 
Lesser grounds such as unauthorised possession of the employer's property, a 
follow till procedures or procedures relating to the removal of property may 
dismissal independently of alleged theft. The procedural problems that arise for 
player in the type of case mentioned above have not been resolved by the Court aa4 il 
an area where firm guidelines from the Court could be of benefit. The LOIIU 4081 
discuss the type of problem that can arise but comes to few flr1n conclusions. 
Other aspects of fairness 
While this paper has concentrated on fairness as the time of it 
noted that the Court has also insisted on fairness prior to the actual dismissal, particularly 
where the dismissal is based on a course of conduct such as unsatisfactory work or miaor 
disciplinary problems. The policy of the Court, in such cases, has been to 1nsl8t oa 
warning of the unsatisfactory work or conduct and a chance to remedy the problem 
a dismissal will be held justified. A related aspect of fairness is the reluctance of the Court 
to allow ex-post-facto justification of a dismissal, but rather to insist on the dismiaal beiJ18 
justified on the grounds given at the time or on the actual reasons. Baker {1978) ...,_ 
both these points and, in particular, the tendency for a range of minor complaints to be 
raised to attempt to justify an otherwise unjustifiable dismissal. 
Procedural unfairness and compensation 
The seemingly increased willingness of the Court to place greater em on pmce.. 
dural fairness may, in part, be due to an increasing realisation that a fmding of··-·, 
dismissal may, where the worker is at fault, be balanced by the level of compattton 
awarded. The reduction of compensation by the Court because of misconduct by ao 
n1eans a new feature, rather it has always been a feature of unjustified dimilual It 
n1ay be, however, that there is an emerging realisation that the Court is able to fta4 a 
dismissal unj~stified pr~cedurally, ev~n if it may have been factually justified, but to 
reflect the mtsconduct m a low or ml award of compensation. The beneftt of aa 
approach is that the two issues can be clearly separated and dealt with independen • 
The Court has taken this approach in both Organ and Epps. Iu ar,., the 
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if the employer had not also been at fault. In Epps, the Court refused reinstatement on ~he 
basis of the incident complained of and the later discovered incidents and compensation 
was also "heavily discounted", although the award was nevertheless $3 800. If this approa-
ch has also been adopted in Meredith, a much more satisfactory decision may have been 
reached. 
The ability to reduce or refuse compensation in cases of procedurally unjustified dis-
tnissal may also aid the Court in solving the problem of formulating a test for 
when procedural unfairness can be discounted. This would seem to have been the approach 
adopted in the United Kingdom (Anderman, 1978, pp. 81-89). although recently it seems 
that the Courts may be placing less emphasis on procedural fairness (Collins, 1982, pp. 
174-175). It is one that leaves a large degree of discretion to the Court while, at the same 
titne, allowing an insistence on a reasonably strict compliance with procedural fairness. 
The Court has, however, not yet attempted to develop a test on this issue and its state-
ments to date provide no real clues as to a possible attitude. In McHardy it said: "we 
cannot go so far as to say that there was no possibility (of a different decision) happening". 
ln Epps, however, the Court, in putting some blame on the employer for the escalation of 
the incident, noted that the dismissal "would probably not" have occurred but for the 
n1ishandling of the initial complaint. In Popham, the Court pointed out that there were 
"matters which (the employer) ought to have considered". 
WhHe these statements do not provide a reasonable guideline on what effect the pro-
cedural failure must have before the Court will discount it, it is possible that such a develop-
ment may come in future cases. This is more likely if, as is argued, there is an increasing 
etnphasis on procedural fairness . 
Conclusion 
The Hennessey decision has now made it clear that section 117 will allow a dismissal 
to be found unjustifiable if an unfair procedure is adopted by the employer in carrying 
out the dismissal. The cases decided since Hennessey indicate that the Court may be 
prepared to adopt a stronger line towards procedural fairness and that, in future, an em-
ployer will need to ensure that some minimal standard of fairness is adhered to. It is 
unlikely however that the standard required will be unduly onerous. In Epps, the Court 
noted that the employers' representative "was a factory manager and not a judicial officer". 
The Court did nevertheless go on to emphasise the importance of the decision that had to 
be n1ade when it stated that: "it is unlikely that any other decision (the employer) had to 
n1ake that day would have consequences so serious". Another possible trend in some recent 
cases such as Holtz and Epps is a more explicit recognition by the Court of the serious 
consequences that dismissal may have on a worker. Thus, while not expecting a judicial 
level of inquiry, the Court could well be prepared to look for a high standard of fairness 
which ensures that the worker's interests receive a proper degree of protection, although 
the standard sought will probably vary with the circun1stances of each case. 
Many agreements already contain procedures to ensure a fairness prior to a decision to 
dismiss being made although, as has been noted, these are still uncommon in major awards. 
It tnay be that unions and employers may give son1e attention to these matters in future 
award rounds and not rely exclusively on the statutory procedure to provide grievance 
clauses . 
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